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The Alumni Association of the Lancaster University Management 
School organised a mini symposium on globalisation, in New Delhi on 
January 17
th 2004. The symposium was based on a collection of essays 
titled “ Making Globalisation Good” edited by John Dunning (Oxford 
University Press, 2003: Paperback Edition 2004).  The theme of the 
book- moral challenges posed by globalisation, is addressed by a 
constellation of academics, politicians, business leaders and religious 
leaders. The contributors to the volume include the Nobel Laureate 
Joseph Stiglitz, Dame Shirley Williams, Chief Rabbi Jonathan Sacks, 
Khurshid Ahmad of the Islamic Foundation and Gordon Brown. John 
Dunning’s incisive essay on the moral imperatives of global capitalism 
sets the stage for the varied and extensive discussion of the main 
theme of the book. The New Delhi Symposium with commentaries on 
the book by three of India’s eminent commentators and analysts of 
issues of globalisation provides an Indian perspective on the issues 
discussed in John Dunning’s book. This discussion paper presents an 
edited version of the introductory remarks by John Dunning and 





Professor Dunning is Emeritus professor International Business at the 
University of Reading and State of New Jersey Professor of 
International Business at Rutgers University. Professor Dunning is 
currently Senior Economic Adviser to the Director of the Division on 
Investment, Technology and Enterprise Development a t the UNCTAD. 
He is past President of the International Trade and Finance 
Association, and of the Academy Of International Business. Professor 
Dunning has honorary doctorates from the University of Uppasala, 
Sweden, the autonomous University of Madrid and the University of 
Antwerp. He has published numerous books and articles on 




N.K. Singh is a member of India’s Planning Commission. An eminent 
member of India’s Civil Service. N.K.  Singh has held various senior 
positions in India’s Civil Service including Revenue Secretary in the 2 
Ministry of Finance, Additional Secretary, and Department of Economic 
Affairs, Principal Advisor to the Prime Minister on Economic issues. 
N.K. Singh was one of the architects of India’s 1991 economic reforms. 
He has represented the Government of India at various international 
institutions including the WTO, the World Bank and the EU. 
 
Professor Roddam Narasimha  
Professor Narasimha is the Director of the National Institute of 
Advanced Sciences, Bangalore.  An eminent Physicist, Narasimha has 
held various research and teaching positions including the Directorship 
of National Aerospace Laboratories, and Professorial positions at the 
Indian Institute of Science, Jawaharlal Nehru Centre for Advanced 
Scientific Research.  Professor Narasimha is a Fellow of the Royal 
Society and has published extensively on various aspects of science 
and social policy. 
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One of India’s reputable economists, Ashok Desai has had a varied 
career as an academic, policy advisor and journalist. He has taught 
economics at a number of Universities both in India and abroad. He 
was Chief Consultant and advisor to the Ministry of Finance from 1991 
to 1993 and was one of the architects of India’s 1991 economic 
reforms. He is currently Consultant Editor and commentator on 
economic affair for Business World magazine. He has published 
extensively on economic policy issues including energy policy and 
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John Dunning 
I shall confine my remarks to some of the contents of my recently 
edited book Making Globalisation Good.  A quick look at the title of the 
book suggests that it might have a twofold meaning.  On the one 
hand, the word good may be interpreted generically as repairing or 
putting right something, which is in some way or, to some extent, 
flawed.  On the other hand, it may take on a more specific, value-
laden meaning, which suggests a morally uplifting and edifying 
process.  The central theme of my monograph embraces both 
perspectives, but it concentrates on the second and is focussed around 
three basic propositions.  The first is that, at this present time in 
history and in our current state of knowledge, market based capitalism 
is the best economic system we have for creating and sustaining real 
global wealth.  While it is possible that there is another Karl Marx 
waiting in the wings, he or she has certainly not yet emerged centre 
stage. 
 
One of the most spirited and well-reasoned defences of the benefits of 
globalisation I have recently come across is that by the Swedish writer 
Johan Norberg.  In making his case, Norberg, like the Nobel prize 
winner Joseph Stiglitz passionately believes globalising capitalism 
offers the best guarantee for achieving two of the most sought after 
objectives of the world’s people – economic freedom and increased 
liberty of choice.  In answer to those critics who assert that there is 
too-much globalisation and cross border economic inter-dependence, 
Norberg argues for more, but better managed and more socially 
responsible globalisation. 
 
This leads me on to my second proposition.  It is that, even if one 
accepts that globalising capitalism is preferable to any alternative on 
offer, it’s workings and deliverables are sub-optimal.  According to 
Professor Stiglitz, its institutions and organisations are just not 
meeting the goals and aspirations of most of the people they are 
intended to serve.  As he puts it in his recent book “Globalisation and 
it’s Discontents”, in its current form, contemporary capitalism and its 
constituent entities are the harbingers of many discontents.  Most of 
all, this I think is well known to this audience.  Globalisation is found 
wanting. In other words, it needs to be made good.  But exactly how is 
this to be done? 
 
Now most of the economic downsides of contemporary capitalism, 
such as the inadequacies or distortions of unfettered markets, policy 
failures of national governments, the mismanagement of international 
organisations, and the challenges of a changing and volatile human 4 
environment are all well known to economists and policy makers.  As, 
indeed are many of the making good remedies. However, in recent 
years, it has become increasingly acknowledged that, by themselves, 
even the most efficient markets cannot fully meet the economic and 
social needs of the world’s people.  This is particularly so in the case of 
provision of public goods such as environmental protection, security, 
and defence.  Markets require to be firmly embedded in and supported 
by a range of extra market organisations. It is indeed civil society, 
governments and supra-national entities, which are the main providers 
of the social capital and the institutional framework so necessary for 
the smooth functioning of economic activity. 
 
However to my mind, most of these problems cannot be put at the 
door of market failure as such.  Rather they reflect the inadequacies of 
the incentive structures and enforcement mechanisms that must be in 
place if markets are to operate in an efficient and socially acceptable 
way.  
 
But there is another aspect of globalising capitalism, which must be 
addressed if it is to be made good.  That is what many others 
including, most recently, the Secretary General of the United Nations 
and the President of the World Bank, have referred to as the moral or 
ethical dimension.  And as one of the contributors to my book, Michael 
Novak has sagely put it, each age of capitalism, and the present age is 
no exception, depends on a moral culture which nurtures the virtues 
and values on which its existence depends.  The thesis here is that 
neither markets, nor the extra-market institutions of capitalism are 
value free. The ways in which individuals and organisations identify 
and perform their tasks, with respect, to what a particular society 
chooses to produce, how it is produced and how the resulting output of 
the goods and services are distributed, reflect, for good or bad their 
behavioural norms, and belief systems, and the incentive structures 
and enforcement mechanisms in force. 
 
It is not difficult to cite examples of the institutional dysfunction of 
some aspects of contemporary capitalism.  They include the all too 
familiar presence and practices of such dis-virtues as lack of respect 
for human dignity, intolerance of cultural differences, dishonesty and 
untruthfulness, bribery and corruption, excessive greed and self-
interest, corporate malfeasance and disruptive social behaviour.  They 
are exercised in one way or another, and to a greater or lesser extent, 
by all the stakeholders in the capitalist process. These include 
individual workers, consumers, investors, corporations, non-
government organisations, government and so on. 5 
But you might ask how does global capitalism fit into the picture?  
Here I come to the book’s third proposition. Up to now, you may have 
noticed I prefer to use the expression “globalising capitalism” that is 
because I believe that there is no such a thing as global capitalism. 
What we have in today’s world is a medley – a mosaic – of different 
brands or models of capitalism.  The Japanese model for example, is 
very different from the Canadian model.  The German variant is very 
different from the Nigerian variant, and the interpretation of the 
Chinese of socially acceptable capitalism is different from that the 
Indians.  At the same time, each model or variant has many common 
characteristics.  Michael Novak calls these family resemblances.  The 
unique feature about globalisation is that each of these resemblances 
are interconnected, and to some extent harmonised, by such cross-
border drivers such as trade, investment, technology and new 
communication advances.  
 
What distinguishes these resemblances?  There are two things.  Firstly, 
the beliefs, attitudes and behavioural norms of stakeholders, which are 
embedded in the institutional framework of different societies. 
Secondly, the respective roles played by these stakeholders.  While 
these mirror the values and moral obligations just described, they also 
reflect the quality and character of the resources and capabilities 
owned and accessed by these entities.  These too vary between 
countries according, for example, to their economic development and 
their degree of openness to foreign trade and investment. 
 
I strongly believe that it is these cross border institutional and cultural 
differences that pose both one of the greatest challenges, and also 
offer one of the most exciting opportunities for Making Globalisation 
Good.  I also believe that international business educators and 
researchers, not to mention the business community and governments 
need to give more attention to these differences in future. Now in 
some cases, these differences, to which I have referred, may not 
matter. Indeed, the richness of many kinds of cultural attributes is to 
be applauded. It would surely be a dull world if we as individuals, or 
nations, thought or acted or had the same tastes in all respects as 
each other?  Yet in other ways, which involve a very different or 
contrasting perspective, commonality of moral and ethical values may 
matter a great deal.  Is this why, I wonder, why there is growing 
support for the view expressed by the President of the Czech Republic 
amongst others, that a global economy needs a global ethic?  Is this 
what Kofi Annan’s Global Compact is all about? 
 6 
What might be the basis for a new paradigm of moral ecology?  What 
could or should be its source or guiding light? One age old answer to 
this question is the behavioural teachings of the major religions of the 
world.  As the UK author and journalist Will Hutton has recently 
observed, in spite of the secularisation of western society, there is a 
surge of interest by ordinary men and women in things spiritual.  
Religion for good or bad, and whether we like it or not, is implicitly, if 
not explicitly, at the heart of much international political debate.  You 
may ask is there really sufficient common ground amongst the major 
belief systems?  I believe there is while a common ground may not be 
found in theology and or dogma, there is a much greater consensus of 
how men and women should behave to promote their own and 
society’s long-term interests.  This is what the four religious related 
contributions in my volume written respectively by Christian, Jewish, 
Muslim and Buddhist scholars suggest.  Later in this discussion I will 
be particularly interested to learn about the Hindu view. 
 
Permit me now just to briefly pinpoint some of the more important 
findings “Making Globalisation Good”, and what I believe to be the 
multi-faceted actions which are required, if we are to move forward in 
improving the social responsibility of global capitalism.  Let me offer 
just one or two bullet points, some of which I have already hinted 
upon: 
 
Firstly, morality – the moral culture of society and its constituents - 
does matter in determining both the content and evolution of global 
capitalism and the extent to which it can be made to be more efficient, 
more inclusive, more socially responsible and more sustainable over 
time.   
 
Second, globalisation itself poses new challenges and opportunities to 
national economic and social systems, because it interconnects as 
never before different human environments, traditions and behavioural 
attributes. To what extent and in what way might these be harmonised 
or reconciled?  The evidence suggests that in most societies, the re-
alignment of institutions and value systems demanded by the 
sweeping and globally oriented technological and economic changes 
now occurring is lagging, and is often seriously lagging, behind such 
changes.  More specifically, the welcome march towards the economic 
transformation of many societies has not generally been accompanied 
by a recognition of its impact on the human environment, and on the 
rules, norms and enforcement mechanisms necessary to ensure that 
globalisation is made good or at least made better than it is at 
present.  Hence the widespread discontent of those who are, or are 7 
perceived to be, dis-enfranchised from the benefits of globalisation. 
Incidentally, there is nothing new in the lagging of moral and ethical 
considerations behind economic change.  Indeed, it took most of the 
second half of the 19
th century for the UK to properly address the 
downside of the industrial revolution. 
 
Third, each of the authors dealing with the four belief systems in my 
book strongly endorsed a basket of similar core, or what may be called 
‘first order’ behavioural codes, should be the foundation for any 
commonly agreed moral compass underpinning global capitalism.  At 
the same time, there was a great deal of scepticism, most of which I 
share myself, about the desirability, let alone the practicability, of a 
dominant ‘one size fits all’ global moral ecology.  Certainly 
institutional, and more particularly moral, fundamentalism is unlikely 
to be acceptable by most of the world’s people any more than market 
fundamentalism. 
 
So the question arises, assuming globalising capitalism does require a 
reconfiguration of the moral architecture underpinning its stakeholders’ 
ideologies and behavioural patterns, how is this best to be achieved?  
What is likely to be its shape and who should be responsible for 
promoting it?  Now all the contributors in Making Globalisation Good 
emphasise that, in moving forward and trying to tackle these 
questions each of the participants in global capitalism – vision firms, 
governments, NGOs, super-national entities, and ordinary people like 
you and myself - has a critical role to play.  This is because as the 
chief Rabbi of the UK and the Commonwealth, Jonathan Sacks, put it, 
morality consists of a constellation of rules, virtues and practices, so 
any attempts to influence it must be a multi-disciplinary, multi 
dimensional and interdisciplinary one.  Basically he and several 
contributors argued for a two-pronged approach to moral reform. 
 
The first of these is the top down approach. This suggests that any 
reconstruction of moral ecology should be exercised by stakeholders at 
a higher level of governance imposing their beliefs and value systems, 
on or influencing the attitudes and behaviour of, stakeholders at lower 
levels governance.  Such incentive structures range from the 
imposition of formal rules and regulations or policy initiatives of 
governments to less formal modes, e.g. codes, covenants and moral 
suasion. I believe, and this is open for discussion, that this kind of top 
down approach is likely to most useful to national governments as 
means of counteracting unacceptable moral or immoral behaviour and 
the practice of negative virtues.  One obvious example, is of 
controlling the kind of behaviour demonstrated by the recent corporate 8 
scandals in the US and Europe.  But a more bottom up approach is 
likely to be preferred by faith communities, schools, neighbourhoods 
and individual families as they seek to influence the attitudes, values 
and expectations of their constituents.   
 
In Making Globalisation Good we identify a set of supra-national top 
down initiatives.  One is the Global Compact, the brain child of the 
Secretary General of the UN which is intended to get the private 
sector, and particularly large international corporations, to work 
together with the UN in partnership with representatives of 
international labour and the NGOs in an effort I quote ‘ to identify, 
disseminate and promote good corporate behaviour based on universal 
ethical principles’.  In other words, it favours the promotion and 
practice of a global ethic.  Over its first three years of operation it has 
had the backing of more than a thousand large corporations, fifty 
governments and many leading civil society organisations.  The second 
initiative is more an item for discussion. It is a suggestion, made by 
myself in the book, to set up an organisational entity, consisting 
mainly but not exclusively of representatives of the main religions and 
belief systems, to periodically discuss and encourage research into the 
ethical implications of globalising capitalism, and to take a step 
forward in trying to design a global moral architecture, which, at the 
same time, respects the integrity and accommodates richness of 
diverse cultures.  
 
I will mention briefly components of the second bottom up approach. 
It is based upon the premise that any lasting action, any sustainable 
action to making globalisation good should not and cannot really be, 
satisfactorily imposed from above.  It has to have the acceptance of all 
participants; it must be fully embraced; it must be voluntary; it must 
be spontaneous; and those practicing it must own it.  The motives and 
enforcement characteristics of this approach are different from the top 
down approach as are its instruments of persuasion and enforcement. 
Let me give you a very quick illustration of what I mean.  Consider the 
influence that we, as individuals, may have on influencing the 
behaviour of those organisations further up the chain of decision 
taking. We have votes as individual stakeholders in the political 
process.  Acting collectively, we determine our choice of government. 
As citizens, we can affect the content and influence of civil society.  As 
consumers, we make our choices in the market place.  As investors, 
we participate in stock markets, and have a voice in shareholders 
meetings.  As workers we can influence our terms of employment and 
working conditions.  We can also be very active, if we choose to, in 
various non-government organisations.   9 
However, at the end of the day any real progress in upgrading the 
moral ecology underpinning capitalism will only occur if there is a 
sufficient will of its constituents and individuals to do so.  Is there such 
a will?  Are we really concerned?  Are we sufficiently concerned?  Are 
there enough of us that are concerned to make a difference?  Certainly 
in the Western world, the capitalist system, warts and all, has served 
us pretty well for most of history.  Yes, there are deficiencies in its 
ethical foundations and in the motives and the behaviour of its 
stakeholders.  These appear from time to time and they teach us a 
lesson.  But do we need a pro-active set of generalised actions, and is 
a consensus about the optimal set of actions ever likely to occur?  
Can’t we deal with, muddle our way through, if you like, with problems 
as and when they arise?   
 
In his contribution to my book, Professor Jack Behrman lists five pre-
requisites, which he believes must exist before any upgrading of the 
ethical mantra of global capitalism can occur.  These are; first a wide 
spread concern and dissatisfaction with the present situation, second 
an acknowledgement that there is a crisis in the institutional and moral 
ecology underpinning capitalism, third a vision and understanding of 
how the various constituents of global capitalism, be made more 
economically efficient and socially responsible, fourth a recognition and 
understanding of the resources and capabilities needed to achieve this 
goal, and fifth a genuine desire and commitment to take the necessary 
actions. I might add a sixth vision how do you motivate people and 
institutions and organisations to behave appropriately? 
 
If these are the items, which suggest how the moral ecology might be 
strengthened, what might trigger the will for change. Another author 
in my book – Robert Davies - has pinpointed five such triggers.  The 
first is the push of regulatory compliance, an incentive system, a top 
down enforcement mechanism e.g. with respect to accounting 
standards, corporate governance and so on.  The second are the 
market signals sent out by the stakeholders in the wealth creating 
process.  It wasn’t so long ago that consumers were engaged in 
boycotting anything that we imported from South Africa because of 
Apartheid.  That was a market signal sent out by consumers.  Then 
there is the recent ousting of Michael Green, as joint chairperson of 
ITV plc, the British based company. This is another case in point, 
where shareholders got together to take direct action which they 
thought was correct.  So market signals can be sent out by the various 
stakeholders to upgrade the ethical foundations of capitalism. 
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The third trigger Davies labels reputation?  All of us, he suggests, like 
to protect our reputations and status.  That’s a self-regulating 
mechanism and it shouldn’t be underestimated.  The fourth is a 
reconfiguration of society’s ethics, for example, with respect to 
corporate social responsibility, bribery and corruption and so on.  The 
last trigger is the impact of a shock and crisis.  The dire events 
September 11
th 2001 are an example and I’m sure each of us can 
think of other similar shocks which might affect our attitudes towards 
capitalism. 
 
So in the early 2000s each of these triggers are partly in action.  It’s a 
start and there is much that I think needs to be done.  We are in the 
early stages of a very long journey.  As yet there is no globally 
accepted moral ecology, or even a general recognition that there is 
need for such an ecology in a globally connected world.  If we were all 
isolated from each other there wouldn’t be a need for such an ecology. 
But we are not isolated; we are increasingly bound together.  We are 
interconnected through trade, investment, tourism and the Internet 
and so on; and we have to have basic rules by which we engage in 
such activities to our mutual benefits. 
 
Finally, let me thank you again for your presence here today, and your 
patience in listening to me and I look forward to listening to the 




I shall comment on the general issue of how we see globalisation 
shaping itself up, from the Indian perspective.  What we think are the 
consequences?  What we think are the opportunities and what do we 
consider to be the kind of risks of the economic strategy we are 
pursuing? 
 
In some ways it is a bit ironic that on the streets of Bombay, yesterday 
and today, thousands of people are demonstrating against 
globalisation, whilst we in this room are beginning to conjure up ideas 
on how to make that process socially more acceptable and morally 
more convincing.  Indeed, to add to all this only last week, one of the 
author’s and contributors to Professor Dunning’s book, Professor 
Stiglitz was in town and spoke at some length on what he perceives to 
be the corrective steps which are necessary to make globalisation 
more acceptable.  Clearly one of the things which emanates from 
Professor Dunning’s remarkable presentation is the broad proposition 
that by and large capitalism as a mode of development, as a mode of 11 
planning economic strategy has served the world well.  And that 
countries that have adopted capitalism as a basis for economic 
strategy have achieved much higher rates of growth than countries 
which have adopted variants of this model.  None the less, as 
Professor Dunning argued in the first part of his presentation, the built 
in market infirmities and the built in infirmities of the capitalist process 
requires correction at every stage, and people need to be sensitised to 
the kind of corrections which are necessary to maximise the benefits 
from this process of adopting capitalism as a mode of economic 
strategy and minimising its risks.  We in this country, for the bulk of 
the 53 years of our post independence period, adopted what has been 
described as a model of planned economic development based on 5-
year plans.  And from around the mid 60’s we began to fully embrace 
a more socialistic model of development.  We began to undertake all 
this in terms of control, on who is to produce, what is to be produced, 
circumscribing consumer choice, with the state offering the consumer 
choice, with the State circumscribing locations of production, and the 
state became the principal agent and the tool for bringing about 
economic development.  The results of that period are well known, we 
achieved rates of growth in the region of 3.5-3.8% with population 
growing at around 2.3%, there was no credible policy of population 
stabilisation, and we scarcely achieved a 1-1.2% growth in per capita 
income.  When we course corrected somewhat tentatively at the 
beginning of the 1980’s and more fundamentally at the beginning of 
1991, we made a major correction to the way we were going to devise 
our economic strategy and that correction really implied embracing the 
principles Professor Dunning described. This included increased market 
de-regulation, legalisation, offering increased competition and 
enlarging the degree of choice to consumers not only in various 
sectors of planning but a change in the strategy of the government as 
a whole.  I think in the mid 90’s we achieved rates of growth that are 
closer to 6.5% and currently we are experiencing much higher rates of 
growth in the region of 7.3-7.5%.  
 
 As we have gone along with the process of liberalisation what are the 
kinds of problems that we have encountered? How has India’s effort of 
trying to integrate itself more closely with not only the ongoing forces 
of globalisation in the world, but also its efforts to become an active 
global player in the inevitability of a globalisation process fared?  What 
are the kind of problems which have been encountered? And what are 
the kind of solutions that we need to concentrate on if we are to derive 
any lessons from the global experience. 
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I would say that as we have begun to totally dismantle our trade 
regime, as we have begun to free up prospects of getting global 
foreign investment into India, as we have begun to free up the area of 
services in terms of much freer movement of goods and services, as 
we have begun to attract public and private partnerships in freeing up 
the process of India’s infra-structure planning in order to achieve a 
sustained high rate of economic growth, there are five critical 
problems which have been encountered.  These are problems not 
essentially connected with globalisation but in some way to be 
perceived by all to be the consequences of what a more integrated 
world means for India. 
 
The first problem is the problem of symmetry of action.  People who 
are players in this process have acted asymmetrically.  India must free 
up access to its large markets. We have already dismantled 
quantitative restrictions, brought down tariffs significantly, and this 
enjoins a certain behavioural pattern on our part, which must be 
matched by symmetrical pattern of the other major players.  Indeed 
one of the dimensions of moral ecology, which Professor Dunning 
argued for so convincingly, is symmetrical behavioural patterns 
between the major dominant players in the area of trade. Take for 
instance the huge consequence of people in this country realising that 
on the one hand some of the major mature economies have taught us 
the fundamental principles of enunciated by Adam Smith long ago, 
namely, that gains of trade, comparative factor advantages, are good 
for you, good for the rest of the world and good for really improving 
the overall health of the global economy.  But as countries such as 
India begin to move in that direction, as they try to optimise important 
factor endowments which they have, the factor endowments of a large 
population, which is skilled, we are being hammered with protectionist 
influences which are beginning to creep up in many mature societies. 
 
I need not elaborate for instance the kind of attitudes which build up in 
this country when we are told that areas such as business outsourcing 
has generated a massive controversy in Europe, has generated a 
massive controversy in America and that this undercuts the very root 
of how to exploit comparative factor advantages and how to achieve 
global efficiency.  Or for instance the argument that India must free up 
its own agriculture but the rest of the world must continue to have a 
highly protected agricultural regime, or that while India must free up 
itself in other areas of services, the world must still have enormous 
amount of restrictions in terms of movement – of national personnel, 
skilled personnel which would really add to global wealth.  So as the 
world globalises, how do we ensure the symmetry of rules and the 13 
symmetry of the kinds of rules which are fair, equal and can be acted 
upon by all partners who are actors in this important global process.  I 
believe that of the challenges of globalisation we face, symmetry of 
behaviour would be one important ingredient. 
 
The second important challenge we face is symmetry and fairness of 
rules; rules that must be devised and must begin to apply to all 
players equally.  For instance, we have been taught in elementary 
economics that we must pursue policies that are market driven, but 
then look at the situation today, the USA is currently running a huge 
current account deficit.  The rest of the world is financing this huge 
current account deficit and the USA is currently running a huge budget 
deficit. This is financed by investments in the USA from other 
countries. The rest of the world is therefore becoming a creditor to the 
world’s largest and most mature economies.  And yet financial 
institutions which have been created to look into these sorts of 
developments like the International Monetary Fund, except for a 
warning which was issued 15 days ago, have really not said a word on 
this peculiar pattern of growth which has emerged.  The conclusions 
would be whilst the world is trying to seek a more appropriate and 
equal reordering of its financial architecture, the rules of the game are 
being written in a manner where there is a lack of equality in the rules 
themselves, and an unequal application of the rules that have been 
framed.   
 
So I think the first requirement is for symmetry of behaviour, the 
second is for symmetry of rules and the application of rules, the third 
is symmetry in the manner in which enforcement agencies begin to 
apply the rules.  Will they apply those rules uniformally across the 
world to make the process of globalisation appear fair and appropriate 
in the eyes of people who are really actors and players in the 
globalisation process? 
 
The fourth critical area relates to transitional consequences.  As 
countries integrate themselves more and more, societies which have 
achieved much higher levels of growth, and per capita incomes   are 
better equipped to undertake and absorb one of the features of what 
Professor Dunning described; the feature of shock, an exogenous 
shock to societies which have pursued a different pattern and model of 
growth.  During the period of transition, if there are inevitable 
consequences for employment, if there are serious consequences for 
large agricultural economies, if there are serious consequences for 
small and medium firms, as large and multinational firms begin to 
seek economies of scale which would be good for the economy but has 14 
serious transitional social consequences, what sort of a social safety 
net do we have? Not as a world but as a concept which has evolved so 
far to protect societies which are particularly vulnerable during the 
process of transition, as countries and nations become more and more 
integrated.  Perhaps the social safety net and transitional 
arrangements which would be adequate for more mature societies may 
be hopelessly inadequate for countries which are lower down in the 
typology of development.  Do we not need perhaps special and 
differentiated arrangements in which the more vulnerable receive the 
benefits of whatever framework is arranged in a manner which is more 
appropriate than for countries that are better placed to face the 
consequences of a much faster globalisation.  Unless we address the 
issue of these transitional consequences we believe that the kind of 
global response that we have will continue to be as differentiated and 
continue to lack consensus, as we see in the kind of protests that are 
there.  Globalisation as you rightly pointed out Professor Dunning in 
your introductory remarks has ceased to become a descriptive word of 
world societies and world economies becoming increasing integrated.  
It has indeed acquired a pejorative value to imply that is a kind of evil 
which in some ways the world must duck.  But we all recognise that 
globalisation is a descriptive word which merely describes the world’s 
economies and financial markets and systems becoming more and 
more integrated for enabling the world as a whole to derive the 
benefits and gains from trade and to optimise the benefits which a 
more integrated global world can give us.  And yet, some of these four 
or five issues, which I have pointed out, remain un-addressed.  And 
the moral ecology which we talk about must be an ecology which is 
embracive enough perhaps to cover these four or five issues which we 
have encountered in India. These are vitally important issues and I 
think the word “globalisation” will continue to provoke strong and 
divisive responses.   
 
I will finally end by asking myself the question, and by addressing in 
some form or the other, of one issue that was raised. It is not merely 
of enforcement but who will enforce?  With whom does the power of 
enforcement rest?  Does it rest with the people who achieve a global 
awakening to the pressures of society, achieve a higher level of moral 
awareness, and detect some cohesiveness in the various forms of 
religious values we have talked about? Or is it the case that this will all 
take time? If these take time, what happens in the meantime?  We are 
all hurtling in this process at great speed because individual 
institutions have their own global agendas which they are all pursuing 
at great speed.  WTO has its own calendar of activities which it is 
pursuing.  It has consequences which we all know and talk about.  I do 15 
not wish to go into the reasons for these developments or reasons for 
their failure.   The World Bank has an agenda of its own; a broad 
agenda, a noble agenda namely to achieve much higher rates of 
growth for countries that have not yet been able to achieve high 
growth rates.  Who is to implement it?  What kind of a framework is 
necessary?  What kind of resources are necessary?  What kind of a 
coalition among the various stakeholders and partners in the 
development process is necessary to achieve that objective?    How is 
the concept of a global compact, a laudable one talked about by Kofi 
Annan to be implemented?  Does the world therefore require, and 
Professor Dunning made a provocative suggestion at the end, of 
perhaps bringing together all different forms of religion in some sort of 
a global coalition.  But if that is the agenda which eludes us have we 
now reached the stage where we require a more omnibus, broad 
based institution which puts together the varying dimensions, action 
programmes and varying orchestrations of institutions to be able to 
meet some of the challenges which you pointed out by Professor 
Dunning, and some of the challenges which are contained in this book 
and clearly deserve our attention.  Today’s seminar has made an 
important contribution in highlighting that economic development 
cannot be divorced from the more broader issue of morality, the kind 
of religious values which are the foundations of societies, and we have 
to take a more holistic view when we talk about economic 
development and when we talk about globalisation because it 
encompasses the deeper roots of societies.  The issues raised in the 
book identify the kind of choices and options that societies have.  I 
thought that I would just mention the four or five issues that I believe 
are of great relevance to a country of 1.1 billion people which has 
embraced globalisation and is now encountering the multiple 
challenges of having to deal with issues of poverty, social development 
and achieve a rate of growth which would be acceptable. 
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Professor Narasimha 
I must begin by thanking Lancaster University for giving me the 
privilege of participating in a discussion on this important book, Making 
Globalisation Good, that Professor John Dunning has edited. The book 
is important because the issues that the 15 essays in it consider, in 
particular the moral challenges of global capitalism and the need to 
make it ‘responsible’, are central to our times.   
 
I have been asked to speak at this meeting from the point of view of 
an Indian scientist.  I shall however take the liberty of making a few 
comments not only as a scientist but also as one who is part of a 
multi-disciplinary institution at Bangalore. 
 
We can begin by asking what is meant by globalisation. Professor 
Dunning offers a definition that emphasises a global connectivity of 
individuals and institutions, and he looks upon the Internet as the 
quintessential vehicle of interpersonal and inter-institutional 
communication in today’s world.  Prof Novak proceeds about the task 
by describing what globalisation is not.  It would seem to me that man 
has always reached whatever was accessible to the transportation and 
communication technologies that he possessed at the time; indeed this 
has always defined the ‘known’ world for him.  There have of course 
been relatively isolated civilizations in the smaller or environmentally 
more hostile continents, but one can argue that in much of Eurasia 
civilizations have been in contact with each other for thousands of 
years; after all our ancestors in India traded with Mesopotamian 
countries more than four thousand years ago.  In more recent times 
the advent of the East India Companies and the industrial revolution of 
the 18th and 19th centuries brought Europe forcefully into the Indian 
subcontinent.  What is special about the globalization of today, 
however, is that its reach covers the whole planet, and its speed in 
communication is beginning to scale by that of light.  Already around 
the turn of the 19th to the 20th century a message could go round the 
world in 8 minutes; today it does so in a minute fraction of a second.   
 
Scientists very often proudly proclaim that the scientific enterprise is 
global, and has been so for quite some time.  Indian scientists of 
today, for example, might often have been educated abroad, and 
frequently publish in ‘international’ journals. Increasing numbers have 
strong contacts with their peers elsewhere in the world. These 
exchanges are now more vigorous than ever, and indeed are leading 
to what has some times been called a ‘republic of knowledge’. 
 17 
However things are not always what they seem, and the knowledge 
enterprise in the world today is highly concentrated and resides in a 
small number of countries.  Sir David King, Scientific Adviser to the UK 
Government, pointed out in a recent issue of Nature this year that 
84.5% of the top one percent of the most-cited scientific publications 
in the world come from only 8 countries; an incredible 97.5% come 
from only 17 countries in the world. (As an Indian scientist I am of 
course disappointed that India does not figure in that list of the top 
17).  Not only is the generation of new knowledge taking place in a 
very small number of countries across the world; but the world is in 
practice sharply divided into those who are capable of effectively 
accessing and making sense of that knowledge and those who are not, 
even though in principle much of the knowledge that appears on the 
internet or in scientific journals is public and open. For there are still 
parts of the world where those journals are too expensive, where the 
internet is not within easy reach, and where the exposure to the 
requisite modern skills and knowledge is far too weak to exploit even 
what is open. 
 
So, even in public science, there is in effect a knowledge divide.  But 
there are other problems as well.  Generating new knowledge is in fact 
a rather expensive business, which is compounded by the fact that, 
compared to the richer countries of the world, the poorer ones tend to 
spend a smaller fraction of their already-low GNP on science and 
technology.   For example India spends about 1%, in contrast to OECD 
countries which spend more like 2.5%.  
 
Because of these gross asymmetries there is genuine fear that much 
of this effectively inaccessible knowledge can be put to use in 
furthering the large scale commercial, strategic and geo-political 
objectives – some times all together – of the rich and the powerful. 
These fears are further exacerbated by a variety of denial regimes that 
are in force, particularly (but not exclusively) in technology. The recent 
experience of many Indian scientists is that visas to the US, for 
example, are becoming slowly harder to get, even for those who are 
not working in what can be considered strategically sensitive areas.  
And (whatever the reason) the number of Indian students going to the 
US for higher education has declined in recent years. 
 
Unlike science, technology does not claim to be international. 
Individual companies as well as countries erect substantial barriers to 
prevent unintended dissemination of technological knowledge, in 
particular to countries whose interests seem to clash with their own.  
There are now a variety of technology denial regimes, and because of 18 
the increasing number, reach and power of dual-use technologies, 
security considerations quite often prevent the sale of products even 
for purely civilian applications.   For example I recall how it has always 
been difficult for India to import high performance computers for 
weather prediction.  So one of the major paradoxes of the times is that 
while in one sense modern technology has made globalisation so much 
easier, and ideas now circulate very rapidly across the globe, concerns 
about commercial and national security remain as serious as ever and 
reinforce barriers to free flow of information, goods and people.  
National boundaries do not matter for electromagnetic radiation or 
atmospheric circulation, but they still do for most other things. 
 
There is the related problem of intellectual property rights. On the one 
hand, as the commercial or military value of knowledge, and the 
expense of generating it, go up, the severity of intellectual property 
protection regimes does so also.  On the other hand the poorer 
countries are often not in a position to protect adequately their own 
traditional knowledge systems, some of which clearly have still a great 
deal to contribute to global commerce.  Indian agencies have had to 
fight legal battles to prevent the appropriation by US firms of exclusive 
intellectual property rights in that ancient medicinal root turmeric 
(‘grandmother’s disinfectant’) for example, or in ensuring that the 
appellation of Basmati rice is not exploited by big multinationals in 
unfair ways. These fights have made a large impact on the public 
perception of IPR in this country.   
 
But of course the notion of intellectual property is not at all new.  
Indian society has successfully practised various forms of controlling 
access to knowledge of many different kinds for millennia! Caste and 
family have traditionally been as fussy about their knowledge assets as 
about their gene pools – as about how and whom their members 
marry!  Nevertheless, the large-scale monetization of knowledge is a 
socio-commercial practice that is relatively new to Indian science and 
technology.  A hundred years ago Jagadish Chandra Bose did not 
patent his pioneering inventions in microwave technology, and fifty 
years ago Shanti Swarup Bhatnagar refused to protect what was 
legitimately his own intellectual property in chemical technology. 
 
There is another kind of question as well, which has been particularly 
severe in fields like agriculture and biotechnology. For example the 
genetically engineered seeds sought to be introduced by big western 
multinationals have often been seen as among the generally 
undesirable effects of global capitalism.  Whether such reactions are 
justified or not from a scientific point of view – and that still remains 19 
rather controversial – there is the added fear that the deep pockets of 
multinational companies enable them to win markets by dumping: 
they can afford to lose money in country A if they make enough of it in 
country B. In spite of all the agreements through WTO and other 
agencies these concerns have not abated.  The technologically 
deprived parts of the world (to use Jeffrey Sachs’s phrase) are 
understandably fearful about the new dependences they are being 
asked to accept, with long-term effects they do not understand and so 
cannot foresee.  
 
In a general way the present concern with globalization is a 
consequence of what may be called a two time-scale problem. The 
time-scale over which technology changes is now very short – the 
processing power of computer chips doubles every 18 months, 
according to Moore’s famous law; but the time scale over which human 
beings can adapt to changes remains of the order of a generation.   So 
a certain kind of temporal dislocation, even disruption, has become 
common.  As people grow older they often feel more and more like 
visitors, or guests, from an earlier age.  Globalization tends to impose 
the disruptive effects of technology indiscriminately on the willing as 
on the unwilling. And the many who may not have gained from its 
benefits (at least not enough), or are hurt by it, are protesting. 
 
At the same time it is being increasingly realized in India that we have 
also gained a great deal from globalization.   In spite of the visa 
restrictions I mentioned earlier a large number of Indians work 
abroad, and have often done much better there than they would have 
at home. Substantial Indian communities can now be seen in Silicon 
Valley for example, and in many laboratories, academic campuses and 
industries across the US and UK.  Coming from Bangalore, I have no 
doubt that its recent prosperity has had a great deal to do with 
globalisation, in particular because of the commercial attractiveness of 
developing software here for use elsewhere in the world. Indians can 
work or sleep while Americans sleep or work, and communication at 
the speed of light can make the whole globe a single work place, 
especially for a weight-less commodity like information.  So the Indian 
software industry thrives on export; the wealth created from the 
domestic market is a small fraction of the total. Some of these 
businesses have grown so big that they can be said to benefit from 
globalisation in the opposite direction; many software (and also 
pharmaceutical) companies in India, for example, are now buying up 
firms in the US and Europe and setting up a presence of their own 
abroad. There are also Indian entrepreneurs who have been successful 
in virtually taking over substantial parts of a whole sector of industry 20 
in foreign lands (e.g. steel in UK).  And there are ever louder cries in 
the west about jobs ‘stolen’ by Indians because of outsourcing – in the 
service and knowledge industries in particular, and to a much lesser 
extent in manufacturing. Indians will of course prefer to think of the 
phenomenon as jobs recovered from those lost here during the times 
that the industrial revolution helped Europe colonize much of the rest 
of the world. 
 
The average Indian scientist, I believe, is aware of both gains and 
losses from globalization.  He lives in two worlds – one of rapidly 
advancing science, where he likes to see himself as a potential or 
actual citizen of a new and powerful republic, from which he benefits 
and to which he hopes to contribute.  But he also sees signs around 
him of compatriots who cannot always take a similarly sanguine view.   
The central question is whether globalization benefits only the richer 
countries or the whole globe; only the already better off or the 
disadvantaged as well.  Indian S&T is right now situated on a cusp 
from where it can experience the benefits but also feel the pressures 
of globalization. 
 
This is why Prof Dunning’s ideas about fashioning the right ‘moral 
ecology’, as he calls it, are so relevant. Perhaps I should say a few 
words here about what the Hindu (I prefer to characterise it as Indic) 
view point would be on some of these issues, as they have not been 
explicitly reflected in his book.  It is necessary to begin with the 
traditional Indic view that our lives are determined by four values, 
called dharma, artha, kama and moksha. Moksha is liberation – ideally 
achieved during one’s own life (jeevanmukti).  Artha is wealth, and 
perhaps it is necessary to point out that this is easily but conditionally 
accepted in Indic systems as one of the important values of human 
society (we will return to the condition in a moment). Kama, often 
translated as desire, is perhaps more accurately interpreted as passion 
– passion of any kind, from carnal to intellectual; once again easily but 
conditionally accepted.  Dharma is often translated as virtue, but its 
etymology clearly shows that it stands for the force that sustains, 
upholds or supports society as a whole. It is virtue in support of 
society; or, better still, it defines virtue as what supports society.  It 
probably comes closest to the concept of moral ecology advocated in 
Dunning’s book.  Artha and kama are acceptable values as long as 
they are consistent with dharma.  Indeed, Krishna says in the 
Bhagavad-Gita, ‘I am kama that is not in conflict with dharma’. 
Mahatma Gandhi had no problem with capitalists provided they saw 
their wealth as held in trust for the public.  
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There is an ancient Indian aphorism, summarised in the phrase 
vasudhaiva kutumbakam, ‘the whole world is family’.  This may sound 
romantic, or even naive, when one looks at the tragically violent side 
of human history. But that famous Sanskrit phrase has a preceding 
qualification that is often not quoted: udara-caritanam tu, ‘for the 
liberal-minded, of course’. At any rate, there are happy families and 
unhappy ones, harmonious families and quarrelsome ones.  But the 
concept of family recognizes the right to relation, counters the notion 
of otherness, declares a common interest and is optimistic about 
setting quarrels – all, of course, among members of the family (which 
could be the whole world).  ‘Family’ starts out as a fundamental unit of 
social organization, but is probably the one institution that Indians 
instinctively regard as a feasible compromise between the demands of 
individuality and of society, and as a goal or model for the organization 
of their own civilization, and perhaps for the whole world.  It is not 
necessarily paradise, but it is workable, manageable, vital, and 
essential!  In other words Indians see that goal as being realistic. 
 
A UK minister declared some years ago that chicken tikka was the 
national dish of Britain.  Indian novels, music and movies have spread 
across the globe, even as they encourage ‘fusion’ at home (with a 
peculiar cultural confidence that their own distinct identity will remain 
not only intact but even prominent in that seductive fusion).  Can the 
same thing happen in science and technology too?  Japanese and 
South Korean automobiles are seen today on the roads of virtually 
every part of the world; and some Tata cars are being sold in Britain. 
Will this kind of globalization emerge in the knowledge enterprise as 
well?  I think most Indian scientists believe it could, although they are 
not quite certain it will. 
 
So perhaps one can say that Indic thinking is not opposed to 
globalisation as such – but it would be to globalisation that does not 
serve dharma, that does not see the world as family.  Perhaps that is 




I am very grateful to Lancaster University Management School for 
inviting me to speak today; it is a particularly unexpected pleasure for 
me that I am speaking in honour of Professor Dunning, because I have 
had an infrequent but very close association with him. 
 
I 
I first read Professor Dunning when I was an undergraduate, it was his 
first book, American Investment in British Manufacturing, and I 
expected an examination question so I read it very carefully.  After I 
left Cambridge, I thought I would not be coming across Professor 
Dunning. But then I went to teach in Fiji in 1973 and Professor 
Dunning was appointed my external assessor; he judged the quality of 
our teaching and helped improve the quality of our teaching.  He was 
extremely helpful.  
 
The Pacific islanders are great drinkers; they are also big people so 
when they get drunk, they break bones!  I wanted to prove that I had 
civilised my students and they wouldn’t do any such thing. So when 
Professor Dunning came for his assessment I used to throw a party to 
my students.  It went all right in the first year.  In the 2
nd year, the 
barman I had appointed was a member of the university football team, 
and unknown to me he invited the whole team to have a drink. The 
beer started to disappear very fast, and they soon started to get very 
rowdy. I didn’t want Professor Dunning to notice.  So I went up to the 
barman and said, “You let them in, and they are not supposed to be 
here, so it’s up to you to throw them out.”  He was only a small chap 
and I don’t know how he did it, he just beat them up and threw them 
out!   
 
Thanks to Professor Dunning, I was so successful that when I went 
there, there were about 40 students in Economics and within 3 years 
there were about 1000 students. With four lecturers I just couldn’t 
cope; so I left the university.  
 
In the 1980’s I worked on technology transfer and foreign investment, 
I used to read Professor Dunning then and was familiar with his 
eclectic theory of international investment and investment 
development path.  
 
II 
My life took an unexpected turn when I was taken into the Finance 
Ministry in 1991.  That was the time when I first confronted the 
question which Professor Dunning and the other authors have taken up 23 
in this book: what is good and bad policy, what is right and wrong 
policy? Manmohan Singh, the finance minister, often used to tell me 
that I had great ideas for policy but that I never recommended 
anything to him that would benefit the poor.  I wouldn’t have been 
worried by this very much but for the fact that all policy making is a 
compromise; successful policy always requires “buying off” opposition 
and when you are buying off opposition from companies or from 
lobbies you start wondering what they had done right and the poor 
had done wrong that we are not buying off the poor as well.   
 
To the questions that are raised in this book, I found a brief answer. 
Once I was browsing in a bookshop on Bungalow Road near to Delhi 
University, and I came across a copy of Abu’l Fazl’s History of the 
Reign of Akbar There you find data on wages of the workers who were 
employed in his court – for instance, his syces and mahouts – and also 
the prices of common products and commodities.  I compared the real 
wages of workers in Akbar’s court with the real wages of an average 
Indian worker in 1961, and found that the average real wage in 1961 
was about 45% lower than that of a court worker, which is not 
surprising because the workers in the court would have been some of 
the best paid workers of their time.  But what was interesting was that 
there were only two products in whose terms the real wage had gone 
up enormously in the 20
th century. One was sugar; the other was 
clothing.  Clearly, both these are so much cheaper because of the 
industrial revolution and the consequent rise in productivity, and of 
what we now call globalisation.  So from that time, I had no doubt 
about the desirability of globalisation and of the spread of markets.  
But even more important than what happened to the standards of 
living was what happened to labour.  There is much less manual labour 
today than there was in the 16
th century; manual labour has decreased 
enormously even in my lifetime.  I can remember many goods being 
transported in hand trolleys when I was a child; that has completely 
disappeared.  There were so many handcarts and bullock carts.  There 
was so much manual labour in Indian fields. Today, if you go round 
Delhi, you will hardly see any hard manual labour.   
 
This, I think, is the biggest change arising from industrialisation, 
globalisation and the development of markets.  Physical labour has 
declined; and with it, the hierarchical relationship between workers 
and non-workers, between workers and rentiers has also been 
weakened.  Before the industrial revolution, there was a strict 
hierarchical distinction between people who worked with their hands 
and people who didn’t. It was so much more comfortable not to have 
to work, that everyone wanted to join the rentier class so. They 24 
became soldiers – which was why there were large armies and 
perpetual warfare. 
 
Today it is very different. Today as well we have rentiers (I mean most 
of us, at least I don’t do too much work).  But we no longer employ 
armies to subjugate and control workers.  We have remnants of those 
armies today; I call them managers.  A manager is one who does 
nothing himself; he gets others to do it.  So the rentier class has 
expanded enormously and has been joined by all sorts of new groups 
for example, managers, students, pensioners, and government 
servants.  It has grown so much that the advanced societies are facing 
a crisis: the number of pensioners might come to exceed the number 
of workers, and these societies are worried about how they are going 
to feed the rentiers.   
 
III 
That is not how the ideologies of markets and globalisation had 
foreseen it.  If you read Adam Smith or David Hume they also had a 
vision of free markets; that vision wasn’t very different from what 
actually happened.  Michael Novak summarises some of the ideas of 
Hume and Smith in his Hemisphere of Liberty. These were the things 
they expected the rise of capitalism would achieve: 
 
It would break the habits of servile dependency.  At that time, 
hierarchy was very strong. You can actually see their dream realised: 
today, class relationships are much less unequal than they were in 
their times. 
 
Capitalism would awaken the poor from isolation and indolence by 
connecting them with the whole wide world of commerce and 
information.  I don’t know whether the poor are indolent now, but they 
are certainly not isolated and are far more exposed to influences from 
outside their environment. 
 
Capitalism would diminish war by turning human attention away from 
war and towards commerce and industry. This has clearly not proved 
correct.  Wars are just as frequent as they were in the 16
th century but 
quite possibly they are more limited in their consequences.   
 
Capitalism would bring people of each country and the whole world 
into closer and more frequent and complex interaction and would 
stimulate us to learn of new goods and new methods through 
international exchange.  This has been the most important 25 
consequence of globalisation, we do actually meet far more people and 
meet more people who are remote from us.   
 
It would mix the classes together and break down class barriers, 
stimulate upward mobility, encourage liberty and civil discourse and 
promote impulse to form voluntary associations of many sorts.  And 
this again we can see happening. In my own lifetime, the dress of 
people in this country has become much more similar.  Fifty years ago 
you could clearly see from a person’s dress whether he was a poor 
man or a middle class man, whether he was a worker or non-worker.  
Today it is getting to be much more difficult. You would have to listen 
to his accent to know his background, but there again the spread of 
television is dissolving accents.   
 
It would mightily augment human capital by inciting the emulation of 
new specialities, skills and techniques.  This too is very true today; we 
have many more skills in the world.  People in general learn and 
embody far more skills than they used to a couple of hundred years 
ago.   
 
It would teach the necessity of civility since under the pressure of 
competition; in free markets dominated by civil discourse and free 
choice, sellers would learn the necessity of patient explanation, civil 
manners, a willingness to be of service and long-term reliability.  It 
would soften manners and instruct more and more of its participants 
to develop the high moral art of sympathy.  I don’t really know 
whether our shopkeepers are any more polite than they were 200 
years ago or how much better our manners are than those in the 18
th 
century; but I don’t think most of us would have much to complain 
about on this count.   
 
It would instruct citizens in the art of being farsighted, objective and 
future-oriented so as we try to shape the world and the future in a 
way that is helpful to as large a public as possible.  If you want 
evidence of this, I only have to cite your presence at this seminar.  We 
are here to discuss, and be farsighted, objective and future-oriented.  
And finally, capitalism would defeat envy.  This is the one issue on 
which I have doubt.  Hume certainly thought we would be less envious 
if we became richer; I not sure how true this is.   
 
IV 
What neither Hume nor Smith anticipated was the explosion of 
communication, of the press, radio, television, internet, records, CDs, 
MP-3. The result has been an enormous increase in the output of 26 
religion.  Religion has served different purposes in the past.  I would 
suggest that basically there are three types of religion.   
First of all there is comforting religion which reconciles human beings 
to an incomprehensible reality.  We can’t imagine today how uncertain 
and risky life was, say, 5000 years ago.  Mankind was very much in a 
minority, and there were very many more, wilder and bigger animals.  
There were natural accidents to which humans were subject.  Their life 
was much shorter.  The average longevity 3000 years ago was 30 
years; people expected to be dead by the time they reached 35.  
Infant mortality was very high, so you never knew whether any of 
your children would survive. You never knew how long you were going 
to be married.  So it was an extremely uncertain world, a world in 
which people felt overwhelmed by the outside reality. And religion 
was, I would suggest, invented first of all to cope with this uncertainty. 
Religion created three elements to comfort people; myth, ritual and 
philosophy.  If you want to look for myth then you just need to read 
the texts of Judaism, Zoroastrianism and also Hinduism.  Ritual was 
the mainstay of priestly religions such as Judaism, Islam and 
Christianity.  Philosophy you find in Hinduism, Hellenism and 
Buddhism.  Second, there was what I would call mobilising religion, 
which prepared human beings to defend themselves or to attack as 
the case may be. The two major mobilising religions were Christianity 
and Islam.  Finally there was organising religion, which helped people 
to live together with one another. Both Islam and Christianity had a 
core of organisation theory; but Hinduism had the most elaborate 
conception of a society. Today, we still have this ancient religious 
heritage; but that is not all.  We have got modern variants of each of 
these.  For example:  
 
If you wanted to be comforted today, you would not necessarily go to 
a church or temple, you might listen to music, watch television or you 
may see movies; these are all parts of our modern comforting religion.   
If you wanted ritual, you would, if you were in Europe or China, go to 
the opera or theatre.  I can’t imagine a more elaborate ritual.   
If you wanted philosophy today, you would read science, cosmology, 
astronomy, etc. We have many more kinds of philosophy today.   
 
If you wanted to mobilise, you would create a new religion like Nazism 
or communism.   
 
And finally if you wanted to organise, you would create religions like 
management or inspirational literature like gossip magazines and 
soaps.   
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So I would suggest that in his search for a religion for the modern 
world, Professor Dunning should look around himself; he would find 
that people have already created religions for themselves to deal with 
the modern world. Perhaps the first thing we need to do is to make an 
empirical study of how people deal with reality – what conceptions and 
aids they use – and  then quite possibly we can devise a global religion 
from elements that are already here.   
 
The last thing that I would say is that this religion which we may 
create, innovate or devise is likely to be an organising religion, and 
one of the first organising religions was Hinduism.  Today we don’t 
take much pride in the class system, or the stages of life.  But in fact 
Hinduism was one of the first religions that was devised for a society.  
What a society needs is that everyone should accept constraints on 
their behaviour towards others and that these constraints should not 
be externally imposed or based on a policing system; they should be 
internalised, which is what an organising religion is all about.  I 
wouldn’t say that Hinduism was a great religion; I am sure that we can 
devise better ones. But the next religion is more likely to be like 
Hinduism than any other religion.  